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PARITY BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR - A 
MANDATORY, PERMISSIVE, OR ILLEGAL 
SUBJECT? 
Michael G. Gallaghert 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining has evolved as an effective process for facilitat-
ing discussion and resolution of employer/employee differences regard-
ing conditions of employment. Congress recognized that because of the 
potentially infinite number of conditions of employment, it was necessary 
to pass legislation that would limit the scope of collective bargaining. 
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' limits the 
scope of private sector collective bargaining. The scope of public sector 
bargaining is limited by state and federal statutes, which usually are 
modeled after section 8(d).2 Courts interpreting public sector statutes 
generally follow a tripartite scheme developed by courts interpreting the 
NLRA. Under the tripartite scheme, all differences between employer 
and employee are categorized as either mandatory, permissive, or prohib-
ited subjects of bargaining. 3 
t B.A. University of Delaware 1975; J.D. University of Baltimore School of Law 
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\. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1912) requires that the employer and the employees "meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment .... " 
2. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1684 n.8 
(1984). "Yet unlike the NLRA, some public sector bargaining laws contain 'a man-
agement rights clause' that explicitly limits the scope of bargaining, typically by 
excluding decisions on personnel management, agency efficiency, and the 'mission' 
of the agency." Id. at 1684 and n.9. 
3. Id. at 1684 n.13. The distinction between mandatory, permissive, and prohibited 
bargaining subjects under the NLRA first was explained in NLRA v. Wooster Div. 
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1958) and refined in other decisions. 
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981); Local 
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 
(1965). 
For public sector interpretations of this tripartite framework of bargaining sub-
jects, see National Union of Police Officers Local 502-M v. Board of Comm'rs, 93 
Mich. App. 76, 87-90, 286 N.W.2d 242, 247-48 (1979); City of Beloit v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 50-53, 242 N.W.2d 231, 234-36 
(1976); see also Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. 
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Mandatory subjects are those subjects over which the parties have a 
duty to bargain. During the bargaining phase for mandatory subjects the 
parties are entitled to bargain to impasse.4 The refusal to bargain by 
either party constitutes an unfair labor practice. 5 Both employer and 
employees are required to bargain in good faith on mandatory subjects; 
however, they are not required to reach agreement.6 Under section 8(d) 
of the NLRA, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment are mandatory subjects of bargaining.7 By definition, any matter 
that vitally affects wages, hours, or any other aspect of the relationship 
between employer and employee is a mandatory bargaining subject. 8 
Under this definition, a wide variety of subjects, including pay and griev-
ance procedures, are deemed mandatory.9 
Permissive subjects, on the other hand, provide the employer and 
the employees with the choice of whether to bargain. 10 Where a permis-
sive subject is the focus of bargaining, neither the employer nor the em-
ployees may utilize impasse resolution procedures - such as a strike by 
the employees - to settle a dispute. II During the term of a collective 
bargaining agreement, an employer unilaterally may initiate policies in-
volving permissive subjects. I2 
Courts have developed a theory, called the management rights doc-
trine, used to exclude certain subjects from mandatory bargaining. 13 The 
management rights doctrine holds that public employers, like their pri-
Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977) (distinguishing bargainable and nonbargainable 
subjects). 
4. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685 
(1984). 
5. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). 
6. National Union of Police Officers Local 502-M v. Board of Comm'rs, 93 Mich. 
App. 76, 87, 286 N.W.2d 242,247 (1979). If, however, the failure to reach an agree-
ment on mandatory subjects is because one party insists upon including a proposal 
that is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the party insisting upon the proposal 
effectively has refused to bargain on the mandatory subjects and is guilty of an un-
fair labor practice. Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349. 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1912); LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247. 
8. LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247. 
9. See Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 61 Mich. App. 487, 492, 233 
N.W.2d 49,52 (1975). The City of Detroit court recited a list of mandatory bargain-
ing subjects which includes the following subjects: hourly rates of pay, overtime 
pay, shift differentials, holiday pay, pensions, no-strike clauses, profit sharing plans, 
rental of company houses, grievance procedures, sick leave, work rules, compulsory 
retirement age, and management rights clauses. Id. 
10. LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247. 
11. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685 
(1984); see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
12. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1685 
(1984); see Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers Local No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187-89 (1971). By contrast, an employer's mid-term modification 
of mandatory subjects constitutes an unfair labor practice. Allied Chemical, 404 
U.S. at 159. 
13. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1687-
91 (1984). 
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vate sector counterparts, possess certain "management rights" that may 
not be the subject of bargaining unless the employers decide to bargain 
over them. 14 Management rights, as a general matter, encompass man-
agement decisions that are fundamental to the basic direction of a corpo-
rate enterprise or that impinge only indirectly upon the employment 
security of union members. 15 Under the management rights doctrine the 
following subjects are excluded from mandatory bargaining and thus are 
deemed permissive subjects of bargaining: insurance benefits for retired 
employees, 16 discontinuance of free investment services for bank employ-
ees,17 employer contributions to an industry promotional fund,18 price 
increases in a company cafeteria,19 and price increases in vending 
machine items.2o 
Employers and employees are forbidden to contract over prohibited 
subjects.21 Although the parties are not prevented from discussing pro-
hibited subjects, contract provisions encompassing prohibited subjects 
are unenforceable.22 By definition, a subject is deemed prohibited if en-
forcement of a contract encompassing the subject would violate a collec-
tive bargaining statute or other applicable law.23 Usually, where 
enforcement of a contract provision that deals with an employment sub-
ject would violate rights of other employers or employees provided by the 
NLRA, courts will hold the subject is prohibited. For example, an agree-
ment between union and management setting uniform labor standards 
throughout a particular industry violates the requirement of independent 
bargaining units. 24 In a second case that exemplifies this trend, an arbi-
tration agreement providing that the wages of union members in one 
state are governed by terms contained in an agreement between a union 
in a second state and a division of a company in the second state was 
found to violate section 9 of the NLRA,25 which requires bargaining rep-
resentatives to be selected by a majority of employees in the bargaining 
unit. 
14. /d. 
15. LocaI502-M, 93 Mich. App. at 87, 286 N.W.2d at 247. 
16. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No.3 v. Associated Teachers of Hunt-
ington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129-30,282 N.E.2d 109, 113,331 N.Y.S.2d 17,23 (1972). 
17. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1971). 
18. NLRB v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local No. 2265, 317 F.2d 269 (6th 
Cir. 1963). 
19. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967). 
20. McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970). 
21. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1685 
(1984). 
22. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 909 (1973), cited in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 
44, 54-55 n.6, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808 n.6 (1974). 
23. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 54-55 n.6, 214 
N.W.2d 803, 808 n.6 (1974). 
24. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
25. Sperry Rand v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); 29 
U.S.C. § 159 (1982). 
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In the public sector, a "public policy exception" further limits the 
scope of bargaining. Under the public policy exception, a subject may be 
prohibited even though it relates directly to wages, hours, or the condi-
tions of employment if the subject is deemed to be a matter of public 
policy.26 The public policy exception is premised on the rationale that 
public employers, unlike their private counterparts, are motivated by 
concerns that transcend mere profit-taking: The primary concern of pub-
lic employers is the provision of adequate service to the general public. 27 
The public policy exception is similar in theory to the management 
rights doctrine in that certain aspects of the employment relationship are 
so important to the employer's goals that they outweigh the potential 
detrimental effects to the employees. The public policy exception goes 
further than the management rights doctrine, however, by declaring cer-
tain matters prohibited subjects of bargaining; public policy determina-
tions may not be removed from the political process and placed on the 
bargaining agenda.28 The rationale behind this exception is that public 
policy matters should be determined by the representatives of the voting 
pUblic. 29 
The rationale behind the public policy exception, the inherent differ-
ence in the considerations of public employers versus private employees, 
is the reason why the NLRA excludes the public sector from its scope. 
Hence, decisions interpreting the NLRA are not dispositive of public em-
ployment issues. There are, however, certain subjects of public sector 
bargaining that do not involve public policy considerations. For these 
subjects the reasons for distinguishing public from private sector do not 
apply and private sector decisions are persuasive authority. The issue of 
parity bargaining agreements in public employment contracts is one of 
the class of subjects to which the public policy exception does not apply. 
Parity bargaining agreements are utilized to create parity in the la-
bor market by tying the wages of one bargaining unit with the wages of 
one or more other bargaining units contracting with the same employer. 
The unit negotiating the clause is labeled the contracting unit; the unit to 
which the clause is tied is the reference unit. 
Structurally, a parity clause can be either vertical or horizontal. A 
vertical parity clause ties the wages of one group of workers with another 
26. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1691-96 
(1984). 
27. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 
416, 419 (Alaska 1977). 
28. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1691 
(1984). 
29. Id. at 1692. Under the public policy exception, the following subjects, all of which 
appeared in teachers' contracts, were held to be prohibited bargaining subjects: re-
lief from nonprofessional duties, class size, teacher load, evaluations of administra-
tors, number of teacher aides and specialists, and the school calendar. Kenai 
Peninsula, 1572 P.2d at 424 (appendix containing a complete list of subjects deemed 
prohibited, as well as negotiable). 
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group of command-superior workers in the same field. For example, a 
vertical parity clause might tie the wages of a group of police officers to a 
group of police lieutenants. A horizontal parity clause ties the wages of 
one group of workers to another similarly situated group in another field. 
A horizontal parity clause might be used to tie the wages of a group of 
fireman to a group of policemen. 
Substantively, a parity clause may be either active or passive. An 
active parity clause imposes the terms negotiated by the contracting unit 
upon a reference unit. For example, a union and a company in New 
York negotiate a contract and the union demands that the contract terms 
be applied to the employer's California employees as well. 30 Active par-
ity has been held a prohibited subject of bargaining. 31 In contrast, a pas-
sive parity clause maintains parity by tying the wages of the contracting 
unit to a reference unit. If the reference unit negotiates a wage increase, 
that increase also is given to the contracting unit. In different jurisdic-
tions, passive parity has been declared mandatory, permissive, or 
prohibited. 
This article analyzes the differing treatment of passive parity clauses 
in the public sector by various labor boards and courts. Private sector 
treatment of passive parity in cases arising under the NLRA also is ex-
amined. Because passive parity directly involves wages and neither vio-
lates the bargaining rights of the reference unit nor interferes with any 
public policy decisions, passive parity should be a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
II. HISTORY OF PARITY BARGAINING 
Courts traditionally have examined the scope of public sector collec-
tive bargaining with an expansive view. Citing unequivocal public policy 
as support for its decision, the New York Court of Appeals declared in 
Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers 32 that 
the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of em-
ployment is a broad and unqualified one, and there is no reason 
why the mandatory provision of that act should be limited, in 
any way, except in cases where some other applicable statutory 
provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public em-
ployer from making an agreement as to a particular term or 
condition of employment. 33 
This ultra expansive view that collective bargaining covers all sub-
jects not prohibited by statute has been limited in subsequent decisions. 
30. See Sperry Rand v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). 
31. !d. 
32. 30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972) (interpreting the Taylor 
Law, which requires the public employer to negotiate collectively with recognized 
employee organizations as to the terms and conditions of employment). 
33. Id. at 129-30,282 N.E.2d at 113,331 N.Y.S.2d at 23. 
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In Syracuse Teachers Association, Inc. v. Board of Education, 34 the New 
York Court of Appeals imposed on collective bargaining limitations 
flowing from "plain and clear, rather than express prohibitions in the 
statute or decisionallaw."35 In two cases decided in 1975, the New York 
Court of Appeals provided a standard for determining the proper scope 
of collective bargaining. In Union Free School District, Town of Cheek-
towoja v. Nyquist,36 the court stated that prohibitions on the scope of 
collective bargaining may derive from "objectively demonstrable public 
policy" as expressed in imperative provisions of other laws. 37 In Susque-
hanna Valley School District v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Associa-
tion,38 the same court held that prohibitions in collective bargaining 
include those subjects barred by public policy, whether explicit or im-
plicit in statute, decisional law, or both. 39 
Although these decisions served as a retreat from the ultra expan-
sionist decision of Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teach-
ers,4D the retreat was more procedural than substantive. These decisions 
merely acknowledged that clear prohibitions on the scope of collective 
bargaining could be inferred from other statutes and decisional law. Per-
vading all of these decisions, however, is the substantive expression that 
public policy mandates a broad scope of collective bargaining. 
The courts of other states also have concluded that public policy 
requires a broad scope of collective bargaining. Courts in both Wiscon-
sin41 and California42 have held that an expansive view of the scope of 
collective bargaining carries out the public policy of equipping the state 
employer with the resources to compete actively in the labor market. 
These courts further have suggested that, in order to compensate the 
public employees for their lack of a right to strike, the scope of collective 
bargaining subjects should be broader in public employment than in pri-
vate employment.43 
Parity clauses were first adopted under the expansive view of public 
34. 35 N.Y.2d 743, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974). 
35. [d. at 743, 320 N.E.2d at 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 912. 
36. 38 N.Y.2d 137, 341 N.E.2d 532, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975). 
37. [d. at 143, 341 N.E.2d at 535, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 15. 
38. 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975). 
39. [d. at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429. 
40. 30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972). 
41. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin formed its view of the public policy requirements 
in the following manner: 
[T]here are three major interests involved in collective bargaining in state 
employment: that of the public; that of the state employee; and that of the 
state as employer. The legislature has further declared that orderly and 
constructive employment relations for state employees and the efficient ad-
ministration of state government promote all of these interests. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin. v. WERC, 90 Wis. 2d 426, 430, 280 N.W.2d 150, 153 
( 1979). 
42. San Joaquin County Employees Ass'n v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App. 3d 
83, 87-88, 113 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1974). 
43. San Juan Teachers Ass'n v. San Juan Unified School Dis!., 44 Cal. App. 3d 232, 
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sector collective bargaining. In most jurisdictions, parity clauses have 
been a long favored element in collective bargaining agreements.44 In 
New York, parity clauses tying the wages of firemen to those of police-
men can be traced to the collective bargaining agreements of the early 
1900's.45 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of New York illustrates 
both the use and adoption of parity clauses.46 In Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association, the City of New York had executed collective bargaining 
agreements with unions representing three distinct units: policemen, po-
lice sergeants, and fire lieutenants. One of the agreements contained a 
vertical parity clause tying the wages of policemen to police sergeants.47 
When the sergeants' wages were raised, the policemen sought a wage 
adjustment in accordance with the negotiated parity agreement. The 
City refused to grant the adjustment, and the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association filed suit. 
At trial, the City did not assert that the parity agreement was ille-
gal;48 rather, it argued that the interlocking parity agreements rendered 
the contract impossible to perform.49 The City argued that the interlock-
ing nature of the agreements would cause an interminable spiral of wage 
increases, because granting an increase in wages to one unit necessarily 
would cause the other units' wages to be raised accordingly. The City 
contended that the spiralling effect would continue ad infinitum. 50 
In dismissing the City's defense, the trial court applied general con-
tract law, not labor principles, to define the duties that arose under the 
collective bargaining agreement. 51 The court stated that the field of labor 
relations is one in which contracts are forged through the bargaining pro-
cess and, therefore, such a contract must be respected, even if the con-
249, 118 Cal. Rptr. 662, 670-71 (1974); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 
320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 415, 225 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1975). 
44. See Lafranchise & Liebig, Collective Bargaining for Parity in the Public Sector, 32 
LAB. L.J. 598, 599 (1981). 
45. In re City of New York, 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 10-3003, 10-3011; 694 
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42, 45 (1977). 
46. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd on 
other grounds, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2634 (N.Y.), on remand, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
3087 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
47. Id. at 2294. 
48. Id. at 2295. 
49. Id. at 2296. The impossibility argument was raised in the City's counterclaim. The 
City raised two formal defenses: 1) no formal contract; and, 2) the participation of 
the patrolmen in a panel hearing was a condition precedent. The court dismissed 
these defenses summarily. Id. at 2294-95. 
50. Id. at 2296. In response to this argument the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 
(PBA) responded that an ad infinitum spiral could not occur because the term of 
the agreement expired in 1970, and the PBA offered to waive its right to more thall 
one raise. 
5!. Id. at 2297; see also Note, The Negotiability of Parity Agreemellts ill Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining, II FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139 (1982). 
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tract proves to be onerous, expensive, or the result of miscalculation. 52 
In Patrolmen's Benevolent Association the parity clauses contained in 
the collective bargaining agreements were enforced rigidly. The court 
refused to excuse the City from performance, no matter how burdensome 
that performance might be to the City. Patrolmen's Benevolent Associa-
tion is exemplary of the early viewpoint that, when a City voluntarily 
negotiates a wage term, contract law requires the enforcement of that 
contract term. 
III. PRIVATE SECTOR TREATMENT OF PARITY 
Parity agreements also have been used extensively in the private sec-
tor. Although there are distinctions between private and public sector 
labor law,53 decisions arising under the NLRA are instructive in the res-
olution of public sector labor issues provided that there is no conflict 
between the particular private and public policies to be achieved. 54 Deci-
sions regarding parity provisions arising under the NLRA are applicable 
to public employment contracts because most state statutes have adopted 
the statutory provisions of the NLRA. 55 
The key factor in determining the legality of parity clauses under the 
52. The court stated: 
By its own voluntary act in equating the salaries of Sergeants and Fire 
Lieutenants, [the City] set in motion the conditions preceding the Patrol-
men's increase. In an early English decision it was established that where 
the law creates a duty or imposes a charge and the party is disabled to 
perform it without his fault, the law will excuse him, but where he creates 
a duty by his own contract, he is bound to make good, notwithstanding 
any accident against it by his contract. This agreement was drawn by 
skilled draftsmen with long experience in their field and the burdens later 
discovered could well have been foreseen and provided against. 
75 L.R.R.M. at 2297. 
53. The differences between public sector and private sector labor law arise because the 
government is the public sector employer. Unlike private sector employers, the gov-
ernment in its role as employer must respond to pressure from economic market 
forces as well as the various factions involved in the political process. See Summers, 
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems In Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 669 (1975); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 
YALE L. J. 1156, 1159, 1167-68 (May 1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of 
Collective Bargaining In Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1119 (June 1969). 
To insure the orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative govern-
ment and to preserve the ability of elected representatives to make budgetary alloca-
tions, free from the disruptive activites of public employees, the concerted activities 
of public employees must be regulated. In the private sector, however, there is no 
compelling countervailing reason for enacting similar regulation. See City of New 
York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175,243 N.E.2d 128,295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968). 
54. See Lullo v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 
681 (1970). 
55. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680 
(1984); see, e.g., Local 1522, In1'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Board of Labor Relations, 
31 Conn. Supp. 15, 19,310 A.2d 511, 514 (1973); Firefighters Ass'n, Local 785 v. 
City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 161 (Me. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5423 
(Supp. 1983) (teachers), 345.050 (I)(e) (Supp. 1983) (firefighters); MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 1978); see also State Public Employee-Management 
1986] Parity Bargaining in the Public Sector 421 
NLRA is the effect of the clause upon future negotiations. A parity 
clause violates the NLRA only when it imposes wages and benefits by 
"straight-jacketing" the reference union in future negotiations, through 
an active parity clause. If the parties to future negotiations maintain the 
ability to negotiate, however burdened that ability might be, the parity 
clause should be not only a permissible but also a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
In General Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Local Union 
126,56 the National Labor Relations Board reviewed an unfair labor 
practice charge concerning parity. During contract negotiations, the 
union insisted upon a parity provision tying the wages of its members to 
the wages paid to similar craftsmen of a different employer in another 
city. General Teamster clearly is distinguishable from the public sector 
cases because the parity clause at issue did not burden negotiations be-
tween the referent craftsmen and their employer. In fact, the parity pro-
vision had no effect upon the reference unit. General Teamster is 
noteworthy, however, for its illustration of the beneficial aspects of parity 
and its analysis regarding the demarcation between prohibited and per-
missive parity clauses. 
Reviewing the union's demands, the Board found that parity was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because it affected wagesY Specifically, 
the Board held that it was not unusual for collective agreements to pro-
vide for a fluctuating wage structure that varied in accordance with ex-
ternal factors such as the government's cost of living indices. 58 The 
Board equated the reference in the craftsmen's contract to another 
union's wage package with the common practice of tying wage raises to a 
governmental index and ruled that a parity clause was consistent with 
the NLRA. The Board noted that parity agreements are condemned 
only when they interfere with future negotiations by "straight-jacketing" 
parties that are entering into negotiations. 59 Under the General Teamster 
court's analysis, parity agreements thus are subject to disapproval only 
when wages are imposed on other parties.60 
The Board's focus in determining the legality of parity bargaining is 
upon the term "imposition." A parity agreement imposes a wage pack-
age when, by agreement with the contracting union, the employer con-
tractually binds itself to enforce a predetermined wage package upon the 
reference union in future negotiations. By imposing wages upon future 
labor parties, those parties are "straight-jacketed" and cannot negotiate 
because no terms or conditions concerning wages remain to be bargained 
"Collective Negotiatiol/.\·'· Act, I Gov'T EMPI.. RI'I .. REP. (BNA) 51 :215 to :219 
(1970) (presenting comprehensive model state public employment rdations bill). 
56. 176 N.L.R.B. 406 (1969). 
57. /d. at 407. 
58. ld. at 407-08. 
59. ld. at 408. 
60.ld. 
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between the parties. By operation of the parity clause, the terms of a 
future agreement between the employer and a separate bargaining unit 
have been predetermined. If, however, in the future the parties can nego-
tiate terms and conditions that affect wages, the parity clause is lawful 
because the parties are not "straight-jacketed." 
In General Teamster, for example, the parity clause merely required 
the employer to grant its union employees any superior benefit gained by 
other employees during subsequent negotiations. The clause did not im-
pose its wage package upon the reference unit, nor did the clause impose 
all of the terms of the latter agreement upon the first. Instead of an auto-
matic mechanism, the parity clause acted as a contingency. If the refer-
ence union received a better package, then the benefits would apply to 
the first union. If, however, the reference unit did not receive a better 
package, the contingency mechanism would not operate, and the original 
agreement would apply. Because the parity clause operated only as a 
contingency to pass on better benefits, the clause did not "straight-
jacket" future negotiations between the reference union and the em-
ployer. Thus, the Board ruled that the parity clause was consistent with 
the NLRA.61 
A reversed parity scheme was before the NLRB in Dolly Madison 
Industries, Inc. 62 The employer insisted upon a clause that would grant 
him the option of adopting the provisions of any future agreement that 
contained more favorable wage and benefit terms negotiated between the 
union and other employers.63 The union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB in order to test the legality of the clause and 
management's right to insist to point of impasse on inclusion of the 
clause.64 In rejecting the union's charge of an unfair labor practice, the 
Board held that the clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 65 The 
Board reasoned that the clause did not breach the NLRA, because the 
clause did not impose any wage or benefits upon other parties or strip 
those parties of their full negotiating rights.66 Specifically, the Board 
held that the clause was merely an effort by the employer to provide for a 
contractual contingency that would relieve him of the disadvantages that 
might result in the event that the union negotiated more favorable wage 
and benefit levels with future employers.67 The Board further held that 
the clause did not "straight-jacket" the union in its future negotiations 
61. lei. at 409. 
62. 182 N. L. R. B. 1037 (1970). 
63. The contract provision, generally referred to as a Most Favored Nations Clause, 
provided that if the union did make such an agreement with a competing employer. 
the employer's collective bargaining agreement automatically would be amended to 
give the employer tho: full benefit of the terms of the new agreement. lei. 
64. lei. 
65. lei. al 1038. The importance in the distinction between permissive and mandatory 
subjects of bargaining is that mandatory subjects may be bargained to the point of 
impasso:. Sue supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text. 
66. 182 N.LR.B. at 1042. 
67. lei. at 1038. 
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with other employers.68 
In contrast to the courts' acceptance of passive parity in the private 
sector, the courts expressly and impliedly have declared that active parity 
clauses are prohibited. The Second Circuit highlighted the distinction 
between passive parity and active parity in Sperry Rand v. NLRB.69 The 
employer executed a collective bargaining agreement with the union cov-
ering all technical employees in the New York area and subsequently 
opened a small office in California staffed by draftsmen recruited solely 
from the California area.70 The union discovered that the draftsmen per-
formed work similar to that performed by union draftsmen in New York 
and insisted that its New York contract covered all employees, including 
those in California.71 Although the union previously had lost a represen-
tation election regarding the California employees, the union insisted 
that its New York contract established a minimum wage and benefits 
scale for those California employees.72 
In holding that the union had committed an unfair labor practice 
under the NLRA, the court adopted a unit exclusiveness analysis. 73 The 
court held that a union commits an unfair labor practice when it at-
tempts covertly to gain recognition as the bargaining agent of another 
unit, recognition that the union might not, and in this case did not, gain 
in a representation election.74 The court analogized the situation sub 
judice to one where an employer attempts to impose on the employees of 
one unit the contract and bargaining agent of another unit. 75 The court 
concluded that, because the employer could not have complied with the 
68. /d. 
69. 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). 
70. The company did transfer several members of the Engineers Union, which had a 
contract similar to the draftsmen's contract, from New York to California. As a 
result, the company recognized the Engineers Union as the representative of both 
the assigned and newly hired engineers. [d. at 65 n.1. 
71. [d. at 65. 
72. [d. at 66-67. 
73. The court initially determined that the California employees constituted a bargain-
ing unit separate from the New York unit. Next, the court concluded that there was 
not enough evidence to support the New York unit's claim that its efforts were 
motivated by a desire to protect the job security of the New York employees. not by 
a desire to represent the California employees. Because there were two exclusive 
bargaining units, and the apparent motive of the New York unit was to represent 
the members of a separate unit, the court found that the general rule that separate 
units have the exclusive right to bargain for members of their unit was violated. Id. 
at 68. 
74. Id. at 68-69. 
75. The court stated: 
We also hold that, regardless of the Union's motive in seeking enforce-
ment of the arbitration award, it committed an unfair labor practice be-
cause the subject of the wages and working conditions of the Vallejo 
employees was not a permissible subject of bargaining in the New York 
City unit. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to organize 
and bargain collectively and the right (0 refrain from such activities. Gen-
erally, an employer commits the unfair labor practices of interfering with 
employees' § 7 rights and supporting a union in violation of § 8(a)( 1) and 
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arbitrator's award without infringing upon the rights of the California 
employees in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(2)16 of the NLRA, the 
union's attempt to make it do so constituted "a failure to bargain collec-
tively in violation of section 8(b)(3)77 of the [NLRA]'''78 
The concept of "refusal to bargain" is a useful ground for distin-
guishing passive parity cases, such as Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 
from active parity cases like Sperry Rand. Under a passive parity clause 
the employer merely agrees to provide the contracting unit with superior 
benefits that in the future might be procured by the reference unit; how-
ever, under an active parity clause the employer agrees with the con-
tracting unit to refuse to bargain with the reference unit. Such an 
agreement violates the requirement, stated in section 8(b )(3) of the 
NLRA, that the employer bargain collectively with each unit. 
In its decision, the Sperry Rand court cited United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington 79 for the proposition that an employer cannot bargain with a 
union over the wages that the union subsequently will negotiate with 
other employers. 8o The United Mine Workers decision, although it did 
not contain the term "active parity", discussed a nationwide conspiracy 
between a union and several large coal operators to impose agreed-upon 
wage scales upon smaller, nonunion operators, a scheme that allegedly 
violated antitrust laws. The defendant operators in United Mine Work-
ers argued that the wage agreement was protected from antitrust scrun-
tiny by the NLRA's policy of promoting "the peaceful settlement of 
industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the 
mediatory influence ofnegotiation."81 The Court, however, held that the 
agreement was not protected by federal labor laws.82 
In reaching its conclusion, the United Mine Workers Court reasoned 
that, although obtaining uniform labor standards was a legitimate aim of 
(a)(2) when it imposes on employees of one unit the contract and bargain-
ing agent of another unit. 
/d. at 69 (omitting cited cases). 
76. Sections 8(a)(l) and (2) of the NLRA provide the following: 
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 7; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of 
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Pro-
vided, that subject to rules and regulations made and published by the 
Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from 
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without 
loss of time or pay. 
77. Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a 
labor organization or its agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an em· 
ployer, provided it is the representative of his employees .... " 
78. 492 F.2d at 70. 
79. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
80. Sperry Rand, 492 F.2d at 70. 
SI. United Mille Workers, 391 U.S. at 664. 
82. /d. at 666-68. 
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any labor organization, nothing in the labor policy indicated that the 
union and employers in one bargaining unit were free to bargain about 
the wages, hours, and working conditions of others units. 83 The Court 
held that a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it 
agrees with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other 
bargaining units; to hold otherwise would violate the duty to bargain unit 
by unit, by not allowing the other units to bargain independently over 
wages. In the words of the Court, such an agreement "straight-jackets" 
the other units in future negotiations. 84 
A comparison of Dolly Madison Industries, Inc. with Sperry Rand 
and United Mine Workers illustrates that for a parity clause to be prohib-
ited under the NLRA, enforcement of the parity clause must require that 
the employer breach its duty to bargain collectively with each separate 
bargaining unit. In Sperry Rand and United Mine Workers, enforcement 
of the parity clauses would have required the employer to enforce the 
agreed-upon terms of a contract negotiated with one contracting unit on 
another unit. To enforce a wage or benefit provision on any unit without 
collectively bargaining over that provision constitutes a refusal to bargain 
in violation of section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA. 
In contrast, the parity clause at issue in Dolly Madison merely re-
quired that if the union made an agreement with a competing employer 
containing terms more favorable to the employer, the original agreement 
would be amended to include those terms. This is analogous to a passive 
parity clause. Enforcement of such an agreement does not require a re-
fusal to bargain by any unit, and therefore is not only a permissive sub-
ject of bargaining, but a mandatory subject of bargaining as well in the 
private sector. 
IV. PARITY AGREEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Notwithstanding the validity of passive parity clauses in the private 
sector, there has been a succession of successful attacks upon the use of 
both active and passive parity clauses in the public sector. The first case 
to question the validity of parity clauses in the public sector was In re 
Uniformed Fire Officers Association,85 decided by the New York City 
Board of Collective Bargaining. There, interlocking collective bargaining 
agreements between policemen, firemen, and supervisors contained both 
vertical and horizontal parity clauses. The City alleged that both types 
of parity clauses were prohibited or were, at best, merely permissive sub-
jects of bargaining.86 In reviewing the City's charge, the Board observed 
that traditionally the City and its employees had engaged in the practice 
83. /d. at 666. 
84. Id. at 665-66. 
85. Nos. BCB-116-72, BCB 118-72, Dec. No. B-14-72 (N.Y. City Bd. of Collective Bar-
gaining Aug. 2, 1972). 
86. Id. at I. 
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of comparability bargaining.87 The Board noted that the practice had 
endured for nearly eighty years.88 Nevertheless, the Board recognized 
that the City's allegations posed serious and complex legal questions. x9 
These issues were so complex and novel that the Board deferred its deci-
sion.90 This case is noteworthy as the first case to suggest that parity 
agreements were vulnerable to attack. 
The Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations was next to address 
the validity of parity agreements in In re City of New London. 91 The City 
had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with its firemen, which 
included a passive parity clause providing for parity with a police unit. 92 
The reference police union filed an unfair labor practice charge against 
the City, arguing that the parity clause "by its very presence and neces-
sary operation puts undue pressure on the City to refuse police demands 
that exceed the benefits in the Firefighters' contract and also makes the 
Police Union, without its consent, a bargaining agent for the Firefighters 
as well as the policemen. "93 
In holding that the parity clause unlawfully interfered with the ne-
gotiating rights of the reference unit, the Board found that the presence 
of the parity clause in the firemen's contract caused police negotiators to 
carry a "double load - in effect ... negotiating for the firemen as well as 
for their own members. "94 The Board recognized that parity is a fact of 
life for municipalities because the City always examines the future im-
pact of its agreements on other labor sources. The Board, however, 
found the parity clause distinguishable because it forced the City to act in 
a prescribed manner, rather than be free to negotiate the issues later. 
The Board reasoned that, because of the automatic consequences of the 
parity clause, the City would be less likely to view the reference unit's 
proposals on their own merits than if only a moral obligation applied. 95 
87. Jd. at 5. 
88. Id. 
89. /d. at 6. 
90.ld. 
91. III re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP2268, MUPP 2343, Dec. No. 1128 
(Conn. St. Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973, 505 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-
1 (1973). 
92. The parity clause provided: 
Id. 
Any increase in wages which is granted to any employee of the Police 
Department, which is greater than that received by any employee of this 
Bargaining Unit who has the same relative length of service in a compara-
ble rank to that held by such Police Department employee, shall be simul-
taneously granted and effective for such Bargaining Unit employee, and 
shall be in addition to the provisions of this agreement. . .. [T]he term 
"increase in wages" shall mean and include any increase in salary and any 
additional payment for services currently being performed, and any provi-
sion for and/or any increase in night shift premium. 
93. Id., slip op. at 3, 505 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at F-3. 
94.ld. 
95. Id. at F-4. 
1986] Parity Bargaining in the Public Sector 427 
The Board therefore held that the parity clause interfered with the police 
reference unit's exercise of untrammeled bargaining rights.l)o 
In analyzing this decision, it is important to note that the "double 
loading" concept, which focuses on the burden placed on the reference 
union's negotiating posture through the use of a passive parity clause, is 
distinguishable from the concept of "straight-jacketing" the reference 
union through the use of an active parity clause of the type found objec-
tionable in the private sector cases. The "double loading" concept posits 
that the bargaining rights of the reference union named in a passive par-
ity clause are burdened in two respects. First, the passive parity clause, 
which mandates parity between the contracting union and the reference 
union, undermines the reference union's bargaining position in subse-
quent negotiations. As a practical matter, during subsequent negotia-
tions with the reference union, the employer must consider the economic 
effect of providing the requested benefits to the contracting union as well. 
This practicality makes it more difficult for the reference union subse-
quently to negotiate an increase in benefits. Second, the reference union 
essentially functions as bargaining agent for the contracting union, be-
cause any increase in benefits secured by the reference union will pass to 
the contracting union. 
A passive parity clause forces the employer to consider and evaluate 
the economic package in terms of both the reference union and the con-
tracting union. The employer remains under a duty to bargain with the 
reference unit. By contrast, an active parity clause forces the employer 
to agree to a predetermined economic package and to refuse to bargain 
with the reference unit. 
In City of New London, the Board did not discuss the distinction 
between the "double loading" and "straight-jacketing" concepts. The 
Board, however, did address what it termed the "facts of life" of collec-
tive bargaining: the employer weighs the effects of granting concessions 
to one union upon future negotiations with other unions.97 The Board 
did not find parity per se objectionable. Rather, the Board found the 
passive parity clause in the firemen's contract objectionable because it 
would interfere with the policemen's right to untrammeled bargaining.98 
The Board's holding implies that an employer can disregard the "fact of 
life" considerations and view the reference unit's proposals as if in a vac-
uum. Such a suggestion is inconsistent with the actual conduct of labor 
negotiations. Prudent employers make such evaluations regardless of the 
presence of a parity clause.99 A parity clause merely expresses in con-
tract terms the "fact of life" that employers evaluate the cost of solitary 
labor agreements in light of their effect upon overall labor costs. Thus, 




99. See G. NIERENBERG, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING 79-108 (1968). 
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exercised by an employer with the "straight-jacketing" that occurs when 
the employer is forced to impose a predetermined economic package 
upon the reference union. 
A reference union named in a passive parity clause, such as the po-
licemen's union in City of New London, is burdened in its negotiating 
posture with the employer. This burden, however, is present in any bar-
gaining relationship. The burden flows not from the presence of the par-
ity clause, but from the "facts of life" inherent in negotiating labor 
agreements. Although the burden may be somewhat heavier as a result 
of the parity clause, the increase does not "straight-jacket" the parties. 
Enforcement of the clause does not require the City to refuse to bargain 
with the reference union. 
The Board stated that another distinction between a parity clause 
and fact of life pressures is that a parity clause requires concessions be 
made to the contracting unit as soon as they are negotiated with the ref-
erence unit, even though the contracting unit's contract may have a year 
or more to run. lOG This statement implies that "fact of life" pressures are 
existent only during the period of negotiations for the contracting unit's 
contract. 
This statement also ignores the actual conduct of labor relations. 
Even if the contracting unit's contract still has a year or more to run, the 
City knows that if it gives the reference unit a raise it will be pressured to 
give the contracting unit the same raise eventually. The pressure comes 
at the time of the bargaining of the reference unit's contract, whether 
there is an actual legal obligation created by a parity clause or merely a 
moral obligation created by the "fact of life" pressures. 
In summary, the Board held that parity clauses interfere with the 
untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference union by unduly burden-
ing the reference union with the interests of the contracting union. lOl 
The Board limited this holding, however, by declaring that parity agree-
ments are not void per se, but are valid only where the reference union 
consents. 102 
The Board's decision in City of New London was appealed to the 
100. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268, MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128 
(Conn. St. Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973) (slip op. 4), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. 
REP. (BNA) F-3. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. The court noted: 
[d. 
To emphasize the narrow scope of our ruling, let us point out clearly cer-
tain things: 
-We are not deciding that parity between policemen and firemen is 
forbidden by the Act, or that it is wrong or undesirable. 
-We are not deciding that the existence of a parity clause in and of 
itself constitutes a violation of the Act under all circumstances. 
-We are not holding that the Act forbids the police and fire units to 
agree upon parity, or to bargain jointly for benefits with an understanding 
that they are to be equal. 
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Connecticut Court of Common Pleas. 103 Upholding the Board, the court 
viewed the parity clause as a far more insidious matter. Although the 
Board had held that the effect of the parity clause was to place an unlaw-
ful burden upon the negotiating rights of the reference union, the court 
held that the clause stripped the union of all negotiating rights. 104 Thus, 
the court repeated the Board's error by treating the employer's "fact of 
life" evaluative considerations as a "straight-jacketing" of the parties. 
The emphatic language used by the court further illustrates the court's 
failure to distinguish active from passive parity. 105 Stating that the refer-
ence union had been stripped of all negotiating rights, the court treated 
this passive parity agreement as imposing a wage package upon the refer-
ence union. This was not the case; the clause merely provided the first 
unit with benefits achieved by the second unit during its negotiations 
with the City. 
Other decisional tribunals have relied upon the City of New London 
cases when addressing the legality of parity clauses in the public sector. 
For example, the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission held par-
ity clauses illegal in Town of Methuen, Police & International Brother-
hood of Police Officers. 106 The town had maintained parity between the 
police department and other town departments. When the reference 
unit, the police union, filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Commis-
sion held that the parity clause forced the reference union to act as the 
representative for both unions and the parity clause thereby unlawfully 
interfered with the bargaining rights of the reference union. 107 In es-
sence, the Commission adopted the "double loading" language and anal-
ysis of City of New London. 
During the period when public employment relations agencies in 
Massachusetts lO8 and Connecticut lO9 had begun the assault on parity 
bargaining, New York courts remained steadfast in their approval of par-
ity clauses. I 10 In In re City of Albany, III however, the New York Public 
Employment Relations Board joined the retreat from parity clause ac-
103. Local Union No. 1522, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Connecticut State Bd., 31 Conn. 
Supp. 15, 319 A.2d 511 (1973). 
104. Id. at 18,319 A.2d at 513. It is in this aspect of the case that the Board leveled its 
most telling and damaging charge against the parity clause. The Board reasoned 
that prior to opening negotiations with the city, the police union's bargaining power 
was restricted severely in that the union already was bound by the Firemen's con-
tract. On this issue, the police union's right to bargain had been taken from it. Id. 
105. Id. The court stated that the parity agreement would "impose equality for the fu-
ture upon another group ... which has had no part in making the agreement." Id. 
106. MLRC No. MUP-507 (Mass. Labor ReI. Comm'n Jan. 24,1974),545 GOV'T EMPL. 
REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974). 
107.Id. 
108. See id. 
109. See In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268, MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128 
(Conn. State Bd. of Labor ReI. Apr. 10, 1973), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 
F-l (1973). 
110. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd, 76 
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ceptance. In that case, firefighters sought parity with a police unit. 
Although parity bargaining previously had been held to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiations, the Board declared that the subject was permis-
sive only. 112 The Board cited two controlling factors for its decision: (a) 
those seeking parity wished to be silent partners in the city's negotiations 
with the reference unit; and (b) parity clauses could improperly inhibit 
negotiations between the city and the reference unit itself.113 Although it 
did not refer to the City of New London, the Board adopted that case's 
"double loading" rationale. The Board, however, did not adopt the rem-
edy granted in City of New London. Instead of prohibiting parity clauses, 
the Board merely declared them to be permissive subjects of bargaining. 
In Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations Board, 114 the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut adopted both the rationale and the remedy of City 
of New London. In Local 1219, firefighters sought enforcement of an 
arbitrator's award requiring parity between fire and police units. I IS The 
city argued that the passive parity clause was void. 116 The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut, deferring to the Board's experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge, held that the Board's conclusion 
that the parity clause unlawfully interfered with the reference unit "was 
not based on caprice or whim and could have been reasonably drawn 
from the evidence."117 The court based its decision on two grounds: 
first, the parity clause interfered with, restrained, and coerced the right of 
the reference unit to untrammeled bargaining; 118 second, the parity 
clause interfered with the exclusivity of the bargaining units.119 The 
court also adopted the holding of the City of Albany, that parity clauses 
are permitted only when the reference unit has given its consent. 120 
Taking a different approach to the invalidation of parity clauses, the 
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, invalidated a passive par-
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y.), on remand, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct.), 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
Ill. 7 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 7-3079, 587 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-12 
(1976). 
112. For a discussion of the distinction between permissive and mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, see supra text accompanying notes 4-20. 
113. Id. 
114. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976). 
115. Id. at 347, 370 A.2d at 955. 
116.Id. 
117. Id. at 348, 370 A.2d at 957. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. The court reasoned: 
Id. 
120. Id. 
On this issue, the police union's right to bargain has been completely taken 
from it. By voiding parity clauses in circumstances similar to those found 
in the present case, the defendant Board preserves the wall of separation 
mandated by the statute. The defendant's action will also ensure that the 
units will be allowed to tie themselves to a rule of equality only if each unit 
agrees with the other that its interests are the same. 
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ity clause because of its interference with the city's bargaining rights in 
Doyle v. City of Troy. 121 In Doyle, a firefighter's union sought compliance 
with a city charter provision mandating that the minimum salaries of 
firemen be equal to those of policemen at comparable grades. \22 
The court invalidated the parity provision of the city charter be-
cause of its conflict with state civil service law, which required full nego-
tiations between the city and the bargaining unit regarding wages and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 123 The court reasoned that, 
because the ordinance infringed upon the city's full bargaining right by 
setting a minimum salary for firemen, the effect was to prohibit negotia-
tions on the subject of wages. This rendered the ordinance invalid under 
the civil service law. 124 
The nature of the party whose rights were impaired distinguishes 
Doyle from the earlier cases. Unlike the earlier cases, the court did not 
examine the effect of the parity clause upon any reference union. The 
decision, however, supports the earlier view that parity clauses impose 
conditions upon other parties in contravention of the public policy of 
facilitating untrammeled negotiations between a municipality and a 
union. 
In Voight v. Bowen,125 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate 
Division, amplified the need to mesh provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement with the letter of the civil service statute. In Voight, the City 
of Long Beach had executed a passive parity agreement with its police 
force tying the wage scale of the police to that in effect between Nassau 
County and its police force. 126 The court invalidated the parity agree-
ment. Viewing the parity provision as a means to resolve a wage dispute 
between Long Beach and its police unit, the court reasoned that the par-
ity provision was the equivalent of the impasse arbitration scheme estab-
lished by state statute. 127 The provision was invalidated because it did 
not contain mandatory subjects for consideration by the arbitrator as re-
quired by the state statute that set out the impasse arbitration scheme, 
such as the ability of Long Beach to pay and the general wage structure 
of the community.128 The court held that the parity provision was un-
lawful because it provided for resolution of pay disputes through refer-
ence to wages paid by Nassau County, a resolution not authorized by the 
statute. 129 
Voight is noteworthy in several respects. First, it is distinguishable 
121. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976). 
122. /d. at 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 790. 
123. Id. (referring to Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law), N.Y. elv. 
SERVo LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973». 
124. 51 A.D.2d at 847, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
125. 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1976). 
126. /d. at 278, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
127. /d. at 279, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
128. Id. at 280, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 603. 
129. /d. 
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from the preceding cases because the parity provision in Voight was tied 
to a reference unit employed by a separate governmental employer. Be-
cause no employer was common to both the contracting and reference 
units, there was no meaningful opportunity for the court to address the 
degree of interference that the parity provision would exert on the refer-
ence union's negotiating rights. 
Second, Voight is the only reported case to treat a parity bargaining 
clause as a substitute for impasse resolution. The Voight court, equating 
a negotiated agreement calling for parity with an impasse that leads to 
arbitration, overlooked the distinction between agreement and impasse. 
The parties had agreed to provide for an external mechanism to adjust 
future wage rates during the life of the agreement; therefore, the parity 
provision was not a substitute for impasse resolution, but an agreement 
to adjust future wages. An impasse regarding an "interests dispute" 
arises only when the parties cannot agree to the content of a proposed 
agreement. 130 In this case, however, the parties mutually agreed to the 
procedure to adjust wages; because there was no disagreement, there 
could not have been an impasse. 
Finally, the decision is noteworthy as a departure from the contract 
law principles followed in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of 
New York. l3l By voluntarily executing the agreement, Long Beach had 
consented to the parity procedure. Through an erroneous definition of 
impasse, the court permitted Long Beach to repudiate its contractual 
duty to maintain parity. 
In Lewiston Firefighters Association, Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, \32 
the Supreme Court of Maine invalidated the use of parity clauses in pub-
lic employment contracts by adopting the rationales of Doyle v. City of 
Troy 133 and Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations Board. 134 In 
Lewiston Firefighters Association, a city charter granted collective bar-
gaining rights to firemen and provided for parity between police and fire-
men. 135 Based upon that charter, the firemen's collective bargaining 
agreement with Lewiston contained a passive parity clause.136 A state 
130. C. SMITH, J. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND 
LABOR ARBITRATION, 103, 103-04 (1970). Most statutes provide for the resolution 
of interests dispute impasses through binding arbitration. In lieu of a strike or other 
economic action, the parties submit their impasse to a neutral third party who then 
resolves the impasse. See Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 540 v. Mercer County 
Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978). 
131. See 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970), rev'd, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2634 (N.Y.), on remand, 76 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1971); supra text accompanying notes 46-52. 
132. 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976). 
133. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976); see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying 
text. 
134. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976); see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
135. 354 A.2d at 157. 
136. [d. 
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statute passed subsequent to execution of the agreement provided for col-
lective bargaining for all state employees. \37 Citing this state statute, the 
contract reference unit, the police, sought judicial invalidation of both 
the ordinance and the parity clause of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 138 
The court held, as had Doyle, that the ordinance was invalid because 
it clearly was inconsistent with the state statute. 139 In determining that 
the two laws were inconsistent, the court examined the collective bar-
gaining scheme envisioned by the state legislature. 140 Adopting the same 
rationale as that utilized in Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations 
Board, the court found that the focal point of the state legislation was the 
exclusivity of each bargaining unit;141 each unit represented an identifi-
able community of interests and only exclusive representatives could bar-
gain for those interests. 142 
Citing the need for distinct units of bargaining, the court invalidated 
the parity pay provisions of both the ordinance and the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The court held that by imposing the interests of the 
Lewiston Firefighters upon the Lewiston Police the parity pay provisions 
evaded the collective bargaining procedures mandated by state statute. 143 
The court's rationale is noteworthy because it provides a different 
view of the traditional invalidation argument. The majority of cases in-
validating parity provisions reason that a parity clause interferes with the 
untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference unit. 144 The Doyle court, 
however, cited the interference of the parity provision with the commu-
nity of interest of clearly defined units. Although both rationales focus 
upon the role of units in the collective bargaining process, the rationales 
are distinguishable. The first rationale authorizes a parity clause if the 
reference unit consents. The second rationale holds that any parity pro-
vision is invalid per se as contrary to the statutory scheme, regardless of 
consent by the reference unit. 
In 1977, the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
went beyond the holding of In re City of Albany, 145 which had held pas-
sive parity provisions permissive but not mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing, and held in In re City of New York 146 that passive parity provisions 
137. Jd. 
138. [d. at 158. 
139. Jd. at 159; Doyle, 51 A.D. at 849, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
140. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n, 354 A.2d at 160-61. 
141. /d. at 161. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. 
144. See supra notes 85-120 and accompanying text. 
145. 7 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 7-3079, 587 GOy'T EMPL. REI.. REP. (BNA) B-12 
(1976); see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
146. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. '1 10-3003,694 GOY'T EMPI.. REI.. REP. (BNA) 42 
( 1977). 
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are prohibited subjects of bargaining. 147 In In re City of New York, the 
police union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city, chal-
lenging a parity pay provision in the city's collective bargaining agree-
ments with firefighters and sanitation workers. The provision cited the 
police unit as the reference unit. Holding this parity provision to be pro-
hibited, the Board relied upon Local 1219 v. Labor Board 148 and Doyle v. 
City of Troy. 149 Utilizing the rationale of Local 1219 v. Labor Board, the 
Board found that the parity provision interfered with the untrammeled 
bargaining rights of the reference union, because the reference union was 
compelled by the provision to negotiate for both unions. 150 In concert 
with Doyle v. City of Troy, the Board found that the parity provision 
circumvented the state statutory collective bargaining scheme by limiting 
the negotiating duties of the city. 151 Although the objection based on the 
interference argument could be remedied by the consent of the reference 
unit, the Board's objection based on the conclusion that parity clauses 
contravene the city's statutory duty to negotiate could not be remedied 
by the consent of the reference union. ls2 
In its summary, the Board stated that its conclusion was consistent 
with Board of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers, J53 which 
mandated a broad scope of collective bargaining, including all possible 
wage terms. IS4 The Board stated that notwithstanding the broad scope 
of collective bargaining "the scope of negotiations is limited by plain and 
clear prohibitions in statutory or decisional law and by public policy 
'whether derived from and whether implicit in statute or decisional law, 
or both.' "155 
147. [d. at ~ 10-3009,694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 43 (citing Local 1219 v. 
Labor Board, 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976». 
148. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976). 
149. 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976). 
150. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at ~ 10-3009, 694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 
43. 
151. [d. at ~ 10-3009,694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 44. The Board explained 
the limiting effect of the parity provision in the following manner: 
The city, by entering into "parity" agreements, has diminished its financial 
ability to grant benefits to employees represented by PBA beyond the for-
mulas contained in the agreements negotiated with the intervenors [(fire-
men and sanitation workers)]. In brief, the "parity" agreement inhibits 
the public employer from evaluating or negotiating over PBA demands on 
their merits, but requires it to view PBA demands in light of the "parity" 
agreement. Inevitably, this interferes with the negotiation rights of PBA. 
[d. at 11 10-3009, 694 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REP. at 43. 
152. [d. at 11 10-3011,694 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 45. 
153. 30 N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972). 
154. [d. at 122,282 N.E.2d at 109,331 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
155. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at 1110-3011, 694 GOV'T EMPI.. REI.. REI'. (BNA) at 
45 (quoting Susquehanna Valley School Dis!. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers 
Ass'n., 37 N.Y.2d at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429): SCI! slipra 
notes 34-35, 38-39 and accompanying text for discussion of cases thaI limit the 
scope of collective bargaining provided for under Board of Edllc. of Hlil/til/gtol/. 30 
N.Y.2d 122,282 N.E.2d 109,331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972). 
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What the Board ignored, however, is that, although the prohibition 
need not be explicit and definitive it must be "plain and clear." 156 This is 
what board member Ida Klaus stated in an emphatic dissent. 157 Klaus 
noted that the parity provision was not prohibited by any plain and clear 
provisions of the state statute or decisionallaw}58 Moreover, according 
to Klaus, parity clauses promote several important public interests in-
cluding wage stability, union security, and early resolution of disputes. 159 
Klaus concluded that the long history of parity acceptance,160 other ju-
risdictions' acceptance of parity in private and public sector cases,161 and 
the nonimposition of wage terms upon reference unions by a passive par-
ity clause162 combine to tip the scales in favor of acceptance of parity 
under the broad scope of collective bargaining espoused in Huntington. 
The Board failed to address Klaus's reference to the NLRB case, 
Dolly Madison Industries, Inc. 163 The reasoning of Dolly Madison di-
rectly contradicts the Board's conclusion that the parity scheme pre-
cludes meaningful implementation of negotiating rights and, thus, 
contravenes the federal statutory scheme for collective bargaining. 164 In 
Dolly Madison the NLRB concluded that, because the parity scheme did 
not impose any contract terms on a reference unit, the parties were free to 
negotiate all terms; therefore, the employer's duty to negotiate under the 
NLRA was not breached. 165 The NLRA section at issue in Dolly 
Madison was very similar to the state statute at issue in In re City of New 
156. 37 N.Y.2d at 616-17, 339 N.E.2d at 133,376 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (quoting Syracuse 
Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 320 N.E.2d 646, 646, 361 
N.Y.S.2d 912,912 (1974». 
157. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at ~ 10-3012,694 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 
45-46. 
158. [d. 
159. !d. Klaus stated that: 
[d. 
160. !d. 
Recourse to such clauses may reasonably serve to promote the early reso-
lution of bargaining disputes and the timely conclusion of an agreement by 
affording the necessary assurance to the contracting union that it will not 
risk less favorable treatment by an early settlement as against those in 
other units who may play for the competitive advantage of a long wait-
and-see policy. Thus, the strains and uncertainties of a protracted hiatus 
between contracts, and their inevitable threat to labor peace and the con-
duct of the governmental function, may well be avoided by the mechanism 
of the parity clause. 
161. See Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); West Allis Professional Po-
licemen's Ass'n v. City of West Allis, No. XX. 17300. MP-294. Dec. No. 12706 
(Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n May 17, 1974), discussed at 563 GOV'T EM .. l.. REI.. REI'. 
(BNA) B-7 (1974). 
162. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at 1i 10-3011,694 Gov'T EMI'l.. REI .. REI'. (BNA) at 
46. 
163. 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
164. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. at'l 10-3011,694 Gov'T EM .. L. Rl'l .. REP. (BNA) at 
45. 
165. 182 N.L.R.B. at 1038. 
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York. 166 Although decisions involving the NLRA are not binding on 
public sector bargaining decisions, 167 Dolly Madison is persuasive author-
ity.168 By failing to address the reasoning of Dolly Madison, especially 
after it was raised in the dissenting opinion of board member Klaus, the 
Board left its conclusions open to question. Because the Board neglected 
to address Dolly Madison, commentators and other labor boards are un-
able to discern whether the Board distinguished its decision from Dolly 
Madison on either factual or legal grounds. Hence, when labor boards 
attempt to resolve issues of parity bargaining, In Re City of New York 
should be recognized as being of dubious precedential value. 
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board also has declared parity 
clauses prohibited subjects of bargaining. 169 Pennsylvania had restruc-
tured its existing wage agreement with one union to correspond to the 
terms of an earlier agreement negotiated with another union. The Board 
relied upon Local 1219 v. Labor Board, 170 In re City of New York,171 and 
In re Town of Methuen, 172 and held that the restructuring was equivalent 
to a parity agreement and therefore was illegal. 173 The Board found that 
the parity provision imposed equality for the future upon another group 
that had no part in making the agreement. It found that the inevitable 
tendency of such agreements was to interfere with the rights of the refer-
ence union to enjoy untrammeled bargaining. 174 The Board concluded 
166. 29 V.S.c. § IS8(a)(5) (1982) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 V.S.c. § 159(a) 
(1982) provides the requirements for choosing bargaining representatives. N.Y. 
CIV. SERVo LAW § 209-a(I)(d) (McKinney 1983) provides: "It shall be an improper 
practice for a public employer or its agents deliberately ... to refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its public 
employees. " 
167. N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 209-a(3) (McKinney 1983) provides that "[i]n applying 
this section, fundamental distinctions between private and public employment shall 
be recognized, and no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to 
private employment, shall be regarded as binding or controlling precedent." !d. 
168. The fundamental differences cited in N.Y. Civ. SERVo LAW § 209-a(3) (Consoi. 
1973) do not apply to the refusal to bargain issue. In N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAW § 209-
a(I)(d) (Consoi. 1973) refusal to bargain cases, the sole issue is whether there is a 
refusal to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., Board of Coop. Educ. Servo V. New 
York Pubi. Empi. ReI. Bd., 82 A.D.2d 691, 444 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1981); International 
Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 589 V. Helsby, 59 A.D.2d 342,399 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1977). 
Refusal to negotiate in good faith is also the issue addressed in cases decided under 
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. See Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970). 
169. P.L.R.B. V. Commonwealth, PERA-C-7323-C, slip op. at 1 (Penn. Lab. ReI. Bd. 
Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20 (1978). 
170. 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 114-20. 
171. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ~ 10-3003, 694 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42 
(1977); see supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text. 
172. Mass. Lab. ReI. Comm'n No. MUPS07, slip op. at I, discussed at GOY'T EMPL. 
REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974). 
173. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323-C, slip op. at 8 (Penn. Lab. ReI. 
Bd. Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOY'T EMPL. REL. REI'. (BNA) 20-21 (1978). 
174. [d. 
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that parity arrangements adversely affect the reference union by depriv-
ing the union of its full right to good faith bargaining in violation of the 
state statute. 175 The Board decided the "double-Ioading"176 of the refer-
ence union was an undue burden, even though the parity clause did not 
impose any terms upon the reference union. 177 The decision thus re-
peated the mistakes of its predecessors by equating passive parity with 
active parity.178 
V. PUBLIC SECTOR DECISIONS VALIDATING 
PARITY AGREEMENTS 
The same year that the New York City Board of Collective Bargain-
ing was reviewing the parity agreement in In re Uniformed Fire Officers 
Association,179 the United States District Court for the District of Louisi-
ana upheld the enforcement of parity agreements in Cooperative Street 
Railway Shop Employees Association v. New Orleans Public Service Com-
mission. 180 There, the defendant public utility had executed agreements 
with six bargaining units. The agreements provided for parity among the 
units. 181 When subsequent negotiations produced higher wages for one 
of the reference units, the contracting units sought higher wages through 
enforcement of the parity clause. In enforcing the oral representations 
regarding parity, the court considered the substantial labor policy pro-
moting parity. The court held that "the evidence is persuasive that such 
oral agreements are also intended to induce the several unions to sign 
written contracts and to give them and their members a sense of security 
that, if others do better later, those who reach accord earlier will not 
suffer." 182 This sense of security is one of the beneficial factors of passive 
175. Id. 
176. For a discussion of the "double-loading" concept, see supra text accompanying 
notes 91-97. 
177. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323-C, slip. op. at 8 (Penn. Lab. ReI. 
Bd. Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20-21 (1978). 
178. For a discussion of active versus passive parity, see supra notes 30-31, 70-81 and 
accompanying text. 
179. Nos. BCB-116-72, BCB-118-72, Dec. No. B-14-72 (N.Y. City Bd. of Collective Bar-
gaining, Aug. 2, 1972). 
180. 352 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. La. 1972). 
181. /d. at 1101. 
Id. 
[I]f any of the other five labor organizations representing [New Orleans 
Public Service, Inc.]'s employees obtained a general wage increase in ex-
cess of the one negotiated by Shop Employees, the employees represented 
by Shop Employees would be entitled to an additional increase to equalize 
their general wage adjustment with the increase paid to the other labor 
organization, unless the increase resulted from arbitration. A similar 
agreement had usually been made in the past with each union. These com-
pacts, taken together, equalized all general wage increases whether a par-
ticular union was the first or last to reach an agreement with [New Orleans 
Public Service, Inc.] .... 
182. /d. at 1102. 
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parity noted in the dissent of Ida Klaus in In re City of New York. 183 
In West Allis Professional Policemen's Association v. City of West Al-
lis,184 the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) up-
held a parity pay provision between the city and firefighters. That 
provision tied the firemen's wages to the policemen's wages. 18S In its 
unfair labor practice charge, the police union asserted that the parity 
provision unlawfully interfered with and restrained its statutory right to 
free and untrammeled bargaining. 186 
The WERC cited several reasons for upholding the parity provision: 
(1) the historical acceptance and usage of parity agreements;187 and (2) 
the parity provision did not interfere with the rights of the reference 
union because the provision imposed no wage settlement on the reference 
union. 188 The Commission thus implicitly distinguished active parity 
from passive parity. 
The most compelling reason that WERC offered was the "fact of 
life" argument. 189 The Commission noted that absent a formal parity 
clause, management weighs the economic cost of its bargaining decision. 
A grant to one unit necessarily involves consideration of granting of an 
equivalent benefit to a comparable unit. 19o In reviewing this managerial 
decision-making process, the Commission noted that "the normal, un-
formalized considerations of employers, on the other hand, are very com-
pelling, not only because of cost considerations, but because of very 
significant tactical considerations that an employer dealing with a 
number of unions must make respecting the relative positions of such 
unions."191 The WERC concluded that this de facto parity process, the 
weighing of consequences absent a formal parity clause, is such a "fact of 
life" in collective bargaining that to distinguish the de facto from the de 
jure parity process, the weighing of consequences occasioned by the pres-
ence of a parity clause, is artificial and unnecessarily legalistic. 192 
A comparison of the West Allis decision with that of the Connecti-
183. 10 N.Y. Pub. Empl. ReI. Bd. ,m 10-3003, 10-3011, 694 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. 
(BNA) 42, 45 (1977) (Klaus, dissenting); see supra notes 156-68 and accompanying 
text. 
184. No. XX, 17300, MP-294, Dec. No. 12706, slip op. at 1 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n 
May 17, 1974), discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-7 (1974). 
185. !d., slip op. at 2-3, discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-7. 
186. !d., slip op. at 4, discussed at 563 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-7. The 
police union's argument that the parity provision interfered with its statutory bar-
gaining rights was asserted successfully in cases that declared parity clauses prohib-
ited subjects of bargaining. See supra notes 85-178 and accompanying text. 
187. No. XX, 17300, MP-294, Dec. No. 12206, slip op. at 5 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n 
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cut Labor Relations Board in In re City of New London 193 shows that an 
understanding of the "fact of life" theory is essential to a proper analysis 
of passive parity. Unlike WERC in West Allis, the Connecticut Board 
found that, despite the existence of morally-obligated or de facto parity, 
legally obligated or de jure parity interfered with the bargaining rights of 
the reference union. 194 
The Connecticut Board dismissed the "fact of life" argument by dis-
tinguishing de facto parity from de jure parity.195 The Board reasoned 
that, because the parity clause legally bound the city to give the con-
tracting union whatever is later given to the reference union and required 
that such concessions be made at the time of the making of the reference 
union's contract, the presence of the parity clause deterred the city from 
granting the reference unit more than that which the contracting unit 
already had. 196 The corollary of this reasoning is, absent the parity 
agreement, the natural political pressures will not deter the city from 
granting one bargaining unit more than another. This implies that the 
wages of one unit always are considered in a vacuum. The weakness of 
this argument is that no prudent employer will refuse to consider the 
expansive consequences of his negotiations. 197 
The WERC decision in West Allis more reasonably reflects the true 
dynamics at work in the negotiating process. Employers will evaluate 
any wage concession in light of its aggregate effect on competing unions. 
This is particularly true in the public sector, where the government is 
answerable not only to economic market forces, but also to the political 
structure of the democratic process. 198 If the elected officials of a city 
appear to be favoring one unit over another, the officials have to face not 
only the members of the other unit, but the conscience of the voters. In 
fact, in response to such pressures, some municipal employers have "vol-
untarily reopened contracts in order to restore parity during the life of 
the contract."199 
193. Case Nos. MPP-2268 & MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128 (Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. ReI. 
Apr. 10, 1973), 505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l (1979). 
194. Id., slip op. at 4,505 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at F-4. 
195. /d. 
196.Id. 
197. For a discussion of management's thought processes in collective bargaining, in-
cluding an evaluation of the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Organization 
(PATCO) strike, see X. FRASCOGNA & H. HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRAT-
EGY FOR LAWYERS 14-16 (1984). 
198. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1977); Summers, Public 
Sector Bargaining: Problems o/Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 
669, 670 (1975). 
199. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268 & MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128, 
slip op. at 4 (Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. Rel.), 505 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l, 
F-4 (1979). Despite the contracting union's introduction of evidence on this issue, 
the Connecticut Board refused to accept the argument, noting that the evidence did 
not show that the practice was uniform or general, and that "[t]he firefighters' 
stance in this very case strongly suggests that they are unwilling to rely on the 
inevitability which [sic] their argument presupposes." Id. 
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In City of Detroit v. Killingsworth,2°O a Michigan circuit court up-
held an arbitrator's award of parity. The arbitrator's award granted fire-
men a fixed percentage raise or an amount equal to the wage benefits 
negotiated later between Detroit and the police, whichever package was 
greater.201 The city appealed the arbitrator's decision and argued, inter 
alia, that the award was beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator because 
the award was not finite. 202 The police union intervened, claiming that 
the parity provision interfered in their negotiating rights. 203 
In dismissing Detroit's argument, the court held that the award was 
not indefinite. Rather, the court reasoned that an award prescribing a 
wage scale that fluctuates on some outside factor does not lack definite-
ness or finality if the factor is itself fixed or readily determinable.204 In 
addressing the police union's claim, the court made two observations: 
that parity clauses have a long history of usage and adoption within both 
private and public employment;205 and that although the parity provision 
would inhibit the police unit's negotiations, the rule of law that the 
courts favor settlement of disputes outweighed that effect.206 The court 
reasoned that, because there is no difference between vertical and hori-
zontal parity and the police union vigorously supported its right to verti-
cal parity, the intervenor was estopped from complaining of any unlawful 
interference.207 The court noted that the parity clause acted as a contin-
gency clause, common to both private industry and public employment, 
to determine and fix wages among different employees performing similar 
types of employment.208 Although the court did not use the language 
expressly, its rationale is essentially the same as that expressed in the 
"fact of life" language of West Allis.209 
In In re City of Detroit,210 the Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission expanded upon the "economic facts of life" argument in 
municipal bargaining. Following the upholding of the arbitrator's award 
in City of Detroit v. Killingsworth,211 another arbitrator had mandated 
parity between firemen and policemen, as well as between supervisors 
200. 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). 
201. /d. at 2753. 
202. Id. at 2756. 
203. /d. at 2753. 
204. /d. at 2756. 
205. /d. 
206. /d. at 2757. 
207. /d. 
208. /d. at 2756. 
209. West Allis Professional Policemen's Ass'n v. City of West Allis, No. XX, 17300, 
MP-24, Dec. No. 12706, slip op. at 5 (Wis. Empl. ReI. Comm'n May 17, 1974), 
discussed at 563 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-7 (1974). 
210. No. C72 A-I, slip op. at 1053 (Mich. Empl. ReI. Comm'n July 24. 1972), discussed 
at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REI.. REP. (BNA) B-9 (1972). 
211. 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972); see supra notes 189-209 and ac-
companying text. 
1986] Parity Bargaining in the Public Sector 441 
and police.212 During negotiations with the police union, the city had 
insisted upon an economic package consistent with parity among 
firemen. 213 
The police union filed an unfair labor practice, charging that the 
City of Detroit's insistence upon parity interfered with the union's free 
and untrammeled bargaining rights.214 In denying the charge, the Com-
mission held that an employer does not refuse to bargain if, during the 
collective bargaining, it "considers" the impact of wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment of one bargaining unit on any 
other bargaining unit.215 
The Commission further recognized that a public employer must 
determine the effect of one bargaining unit's contract on any other unit 
because the city, like other large employers, recognizes relationships be-
tween salaries.216 In fact, the Commission not only recognized that such 
considerations are economic "facts of life," but it acknowledged that to 
foreclose such considerations would impose an undue hardship upon the 
parties.217 
The most recent decision to approve parity was issued by the Court 
of Appeals of New York in Niagara Wheatfield Administrators v. Niag-
ara Wheatfield. 218 In that case, school administrators had executed a 
collective bargaining agreement that tied their salaries to those of teach-
ers.219 After expiration of the contract and during negotiations for a new 
agreement, the reference teacher unit received a salary increase.22o Rely-
ing upon the tie-in provision of the expired contract, the administrators 
sought a salary increase in order to maintain the salary ratio specified in 
the expired contract.221 
When the school board refused to adjust wages the administrators 
filed a grievance, which led to arbitration. When the arbitrator ordered 
compliance with the tie-in provision, the school board filed suit alleging, 
inter alia, that the tie-in provision was against public policy and therefore 
212. No. e72 A-I, slip op. at 1056, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 
B-lO. 
213. Id., slip op. at lOSS, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-9. 
214. Id., slip op. at lOSS-56, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-9, B-
10. 
215. Id., slip op. at 1056, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-1!. 
216. Id., slip op. at 1057, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-1!. 
217. Id., slip op. at 1057, discussed at 491 GOy'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at B-II. 
Taking a sample of the testimony adduced at the hearing, the commission noted: 
Mr. Freemont was asked on cross-examination by counsel for DPOA: 
"Now, would this be a fair statement: that the City of Detroit did not 
negotiate wages and other fringe benefits with the DPOA without taking 
into consideration the additional cost for wages to be paid the firefighters 
and the lieutenants and sergeants?" Mr. Freemont answered "Yes." 
Id. (emphasis supplied by the commission). 
218. 44 N.Y.2d 68, 375 N.E.2d 37, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1978). 
219. Id. at 71, 375 N.E.2d at 39, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 83. 
220.Id. 
221. Id. 
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was illegal. 222 The school board argued that the tie-in provision emascu-
lated the board's ability to effectively negotiate a new contract.223 
The court rejected the school board's argument and enforced the tie-
in provision. In addressing general public policy, the court noted that 
"we must first observe that the tie-in provision is not offensive to public 
policy. . .. Neither can it be said at this time that continuation of the tie-
in provision during the period of contract negotiations contravenes pub-
lic policy. "224 The court next addressed the effect of the provision on the 
negotiating position of the school board. The court held that "although 
the bargaining position of the association is thereby bolstered, the school 
board's ability to negotiate effectively has not been so encumbered that it 
has, in essence, lost control over this important facet of its operation. "225 
The court, by express and implied reasoning, rejected the two princi-
pal arguments asserted against parity agreements. First, the court held 
that the parity provision did not circumvent the employer's duty to fully 
negotiate. The employer must negotiate on each provision proposed by 
the union. The agreement to adjust future wages by means of an external 
force, rather than through negotiations, did not act as an unlawful dele-
gation of the negotiating authority. 
The court also implied that the provision does not restrain or inter-
fere with the untrammeled bargaining rights of the teachers' union by 
forcing them to negotiate for themselves and the administrators. The 
court noted that, although the agreement guaranteed salary increments 
to association members upon an increase in teachers' salaries, nothing in 
the agreement assured that teachers' salaries would be increased substan-
tially or even at all.226 
The court further observed that the school board's voluntary agree-
ment to raise teachers' salaries during the period of negotiations with the 
association, thereby raising association members' salaries, hardly demon-
strated that the school board had lost control over its negotiations with 
the association.227 In essence, the court held that tie-in provisions are 
economic "facts of life" that enhance the bargaining position of the con-
tracting union without emasculating the duties of the employer or inter-
fering with the negotiating rights of the reference union. 
In City of Schenectady v. City Firefighters' Union,228 the Supreme 
Court of New York addressed the legality of parity pay clauses at the 
request of the firefighters' union which requested that the court enforce 
an arbitration award which required wage parity between firefighters and 
police. The supreme court followed the analysis provided by the Court 
222. Id. at 72, 375 N.E.2d at 39, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 83. 
223. Id. at 73, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 84. 
224. Id. at 73, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 85. 
225. /d. at 73-74, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 85. 
226.Id. 
227.Id. 
228. 85 A.D.2d 116, 448 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1982). 
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of Appeals of New York in Niagara Wheatfield 229 and rejected a rule 
that would permit per se invalidation of parity clauses. Instead, the 
court adopted a rule which allows for case-by-case examination of parity 
provisions in the context of the circumstances in each case.230 
The court specifically rejected two public policy arguments which 
often are advanced by opponents of parity bargaining: 
(1) [A] provision requiring parity for all such groups inhibits 
a public employer from entering into later negotiations with 
one of the groups on the merits of [that group's] particular de-
mand and thus limits "the full range of negotiations to which 
the City is entitled under [its statutory scheme]" and (2) once 
having negotiated additional benefits for one group, the em-
ployer is foreclosed from negotiating on the demands for equal-
ity of treatment by other groups entitled to parity under the 
agreement.231 
In acting to enforce the terms of the arbitration award, the court noted 
that parity clauses serve a legitimate public policy and do not "straight-
jacket" the parties during subsequent negotiations.232 This aspect of City 
of Schenectady illustrates the common sense approach found in public 
and private sector cases that have validated passive parity clauses. 
City of Schenectady potentially is distinguishable from other passive 
parity cases on the basis of one critical aspect of its analysis. The court, 
by basing its holding in part on the joint negotiations conducted by the 
negotiating unit, the reference unit, and the employer,233 interjects by 
implication a requirement that the reference unit consent to the parity 
agreement between the contracting unit and the employer. The court's 
holding effectively has compromised the heretofore untrammeled bar-
gaining rights of the contracting unit. In effect, the rule enunciated in 
City of Schenectady provides the reference unit with free rein to interfere 
with and even coerce contracting units attempting to exercise their nego-
tiating rights. 
The requirement that the negotiating unit obtain consent from the 
reference unit also compromises unit exclusivity. Utilization of this re-
229. See supra text accompanying notes 218-27. 
230. 85 A.D.2d at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808. 
231. Id. at 118,448 N.Y.S.2d at 8089. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 117,448 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The court specifically noted that the employer, the 
City of Schenectady, had agreed to accept the passive parity clause only after com-
pleting joint negotiations with the contracting and reference units. Id. Further-
more, the court based its validation of passive parity, in large part, upon 
Schenectady's eventual resolution of its contract dispute with the reference unit. Id. 
at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 809. These facts have led one commentator to conclude 
that City of Schenectady stands for the proposition that parity bargaining is lawful 
only where the reference unit consents to the arrangement. See Note, The Negotia-
bility of Parity Agreements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 11 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 139, 157 (1982). 
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quirement allows the reference unit to give what amounts to final ap-
proval to a parity provision secured by the negotiating unit. 
Although City of Schenectady upholds the parity clause, the court's 
analysis is seriously flawed. Utilization of reference unit consent unduly 
restrains the employer and the negotiating unit in the conduct of their 
labor relations and distorts unit exclusivity. Hence, City of Schenectady 
should be accorded minimal persuasive merit in resolving parity bargain-
ing issues. 
VI. THE DISTINCTION IN VIEWS 
The majority view is that parity agreements in the public sector are 
prohibited. Employment relations boards in Massachusetts,234 Connecti-
cut,235 Pennsylvania,236 and New York,237 as well as courts in Connecti-
cut,238 New York,239 and Maine240 have invalidated those provisions 
with two common themes (1) because the reference unit necessarily must 
negotiate on behalf of the contracting unit, parity provisions inherently 
thrust such additional economic burdens upon the reference unit that the 
ability of the reference unit to negotiate freely their own demands has 
been restrained241 and (2) the effect of any parity agreement is to equalize 
the benefits between the contracting and reference units, thus removing 
the reference unit's right to bargain with respect to the terms covered by 
the parity agreement. 242 
The minority view recognizes that, because all parties to the bar-
gaining process bring various economic burdens to the bargaining table, 
an employer is compelled to examine its concessions to one party in light 
of its future effect on other parties.243 Unions also realize this economic 
"fact of life" in selecting those provisions to be advanced at the bargain-
ing table. In contrast to the unrealistic de jure versus de facto distinction 
espoused by the majority, the minority view captures the reality of the 
234. In re Town of Methuen, No. MUP-507, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Lab. ReI. Comm'n Jan. 
24, 1974), discussed at 545 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-15 (1974). 
235. In re City of New London, Case Nos. MPP-2268 and MUPP-2343, Dec. No. 1128 
(Conn. St. Bd. of Lab. ReI. Apr. 10, 1973),505 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) F-l 
(1973). 
236. P.L.R.B. v. Commonwealth, No. PERA-C-7323, slip op. at 1 (Penn. Lab. ReI. Bd. 
Mar. 22, 1978), discussed at 760 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 20 (1978). 
237. In re City of New York, 10 N.Y. Publ. Empl. ReI. Bd., ~~ 10-3003, 10-3011, 694 
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 42, 45 (1977) (Klaus, dissenting). 
238. Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor ReI. Bd., 171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976); 
Local 1522 v. Connecticut Labor ReI. Bd., 31 Conn. Supp. 15,319 A.2d 511 (1973). 
239. Doyle v. City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1976); Voight v. Bowen, 
53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1976). 
240. Firefighters Ass'n Local 785 v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976). 
241. G. NIERENBERG, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING 48,54 (1968). 
242. See X. FRANSCOGNA & H. HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR LAW-
YERS 14, 16(1984). 
243. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 
1159, 1167-68 (1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits o/Collective Bargaining in 
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1119 (1969). 
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collective bargaining process. Both the employer and union engage in 
economic "fact of life" considerations and deliberations. The minority 
position, however, is correct: The passive parity agreement does not cre-
ate, economic "facts of life;" it merely crystallizes them in written form. 
The majority view is founded upon an erroneous "but for" argu-
ment. The argument is premised on the view that but for the passive 
parity clause the municipal employer would examine only the merits of 
the reference unit's proposals. This is an unrealistic view. Every em-
ployer, or for that matter any negotiating principal, examines all the con-
sequences of its bargaining decisions. These external consequences are 
not limited to competing unions; rather, they may extend to financiers, 
stockholders, and taxpayers. Thus, even absent a passive parity clause, 
an employer will not bargain over union proposals in a vacuum. 
The majority view is also flawed fatally due to some shallow legal 
analysis. The majority view concludes that the effect of the parity clause 
is to equalize the benefits among the contracting and the reference union, 
which "straight-jackets" the reference union in its own bargaining. This 
conclusion is based only upon the effects of parity and does not consider 
the means undertaken to gain those effects. The majority view thus fails 
to distinguish among the various types of parity clauses. 
The minority view classifies parity as either active or passive. 
Although the effect of equalization is common to both parities, the meth-
ods of equalization are different. An active parity clause requires the 
employer to impose the wage terms of the contracting unit upon the ref-
erence unit. The minority view, in agreement with the majority view, 
holds these clauses to be illegal because such a contractual imposition 
strips the reference unit of any meaningful bargaining opportunities. The 
evil is not the resulting equality of contracts, but the means taken to 
achieve the result: the use of an active parity clause. 
In contrast to the majority, the minority's analysis has identified the 
passive parity clause. As with the active parity clause, the effect of a 
passive parity clause is equality of contracts between the contracting and 
reference unions. The passive parity clause, however, accomplishes 
equality by requiring that any superior benefits earned by the reference 
unit be applied to the contracting unit. The reference unit is free to nego-
tiate as to all subjects. The only limitations are those imposed by the 
market. 
In addition to the foregoing factual and legal arguments, strong pub-
lic policy reasons support the validity of passive parity agreements. The 
basic policy of the national labor laws is to minimize the disruption to 
commerce caused by labor strife by promoting collective bargaining. 244 
244. "The theory of the Act [NLRA] is that free opportunity for negotiation with ac-
credited representatives of the employees is likely to promote industrial peace and 
may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not 
attempt to compel." N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 
(1937). 
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To accomplish this goal, courts have recognized that the lawful scope of 
collective bargaining subjects is quite broad.24s Thus, as demonstrated in 
the discussion of the private sector cases,246 the scope of lawful collective 
bargaining subjects includes passive parity agreements. 
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,247 the Supreme Court com-
mented upon the lawfulness of parity agreements by holding that uni-
formity of labor standards is a legitimate aim of any national labor 
organization. In General Teamsters, Warehouse & Dairy Employees, Lo-
cal Union 126,248 the NLRB declared that a passive parity clause was a 
lawful subject of mandatory bargaining because the clause affected wages 
as a fluctuating structure similar to a cost of living index. In Dolly 
Madison Industries,249 the NLRB validated a passive parity clause be-
cause the moving party intended only to assure that its agreed-upon wage 
structure was not disadvantaged by any subsequent wage package won 
by a competitor. In short, because of the mutual assurances involved, the 
use of passive parity clauses has promoted earlier contract agreements 
and has led to labor stability in the private sector. 
As in the private sector, the validity of a passive parity provision 
found in a collective agreement negotiated by a public employer turns 
upon whether the provision constitutes a term or condition of employ-
ment. 2S0 In the event the parity provision constitutes a term or condition 
of employment, the public employer must negotiate the inclusion of such 
term or condition and, upon reaching an understanding, must incorpo-
rate the parity provision into the collective agreement absent some statu-
tory provision to the contrary.2SI 
These statutory prohibitions arise not from the uniqueness of public 
employees or from the work they perform, but from the unique nature of 
the government in the role of employer.2s2 Unlike the private sector em-
ployer, the government, as a decision-making body, must comply with a 
multitude of constitutions, statutes, and ordinances and must answer ul-
timately to various participants in the democratic process.2S3 
Perhaps the primary countervailing reason for enacting such 
prohibitions in the private sector is to protect an employer's ability to 
remain competitive in the marketplace; however, the need for orderly 
functioning of a democratic form of representative government and the 
245. See Board of Educ. of Huntington v. Associated Teachers, 30 N. Y.2d 122, 130, 282 
N.E.2d 169, 173,331 N.Y.S.2d 17,23 (1972). 
246. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text. 
247. 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. 
248. 176 N.L.R.B. 406 (1969); see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
249. 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970); see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
250. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d at 128,282 N.E.2d at 112,331 
N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
251. [d. 
252. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems o/Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 
U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975). 
253. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1977); Summers, supra 
note 252, at 669-73. 
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preservation of the right of elected representatives to make budgetary 
allocations free from the disruptive activities of its public employees re-
quire statutory prohibitions in the public sector. 254 Thus, for example, to 
insure the uninterrupted functioning of government, public employees 
have been restricted in the exercise of the most basic concerted activity 
- the right to strike.255 
There is no feature unique to government that justifies prohibiting 
the use of parity clauses. Rather, there are important benefits to the gov-
ernment employer/employee relationship derived from the use of parity 
clauses. Passive parity clauses produce stable labor relations by encour-
aging public employees to settle early.256 Such contractual provisions 
provide the contracting union with the security that it will not be disad-
vantaged by signing early. This security is the key to productive labor 
relations.257 Further, parity agreements provide the governmental em-
ployer with the wage flexibility to recruit and retain the most competent 
employees in a highly competitive market.258 Finally, parity provides for 
the uniform treatment of similarly situated employees.259 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of an active parity clause in a contract between a labor 
unit and an employer requires the employer to impose previously negoti-
ated wage, benefit, and conditions of employment terms on the reference 
labor unit during subsequent negotiations. Because an active parity 
clause compromises the reference unit's right to engage in open, compre-
hensive bargaining with an employer, the clause clearly is an illegal sub-
ject of bargaining under the NLRA and state statutes patterned after the 
NLRA. 
The inclusion of a passive parity clause in a contract between a labor 
unit and an employer does not impose terms on a subsequently negotiat-
ing reference unit. A passive parity clause merely maintains parity be-
tween a negotiating labor unit and the reference unit by passing on to the 
negotiating unit enhanced benefits that are provided to the reference unit 
by the employer during subsequent negotiations. A passive parity clause 
does not impose previously negotiated terms on unwilling parties; ac-
cordingly, inclusion of a passive parity clause in a labor contract does not 
compromise the untrammeled bargaining rights of the reference unit or 
the employer. 
254. City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 186, 243 N.E.2d 128, 134, 295 
N.Y.S.2d 901, 909 (1968). 
255. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 563, 251 
N.E.2d 15, 18 (1969). 
256. Cooperative St. Ry. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D. 
La. 1972). 
257. M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 1,2 (1965). 
258. San Joaquin County Employees Ass'n v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App.3d 83, 
88,113 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942, 2944 (1974). 
259. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965). 
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The use of passive parity clauses in public sector bargaining should 
be encouraged, because passive parity clauses promote wage stability, 
provide for increased union security, and permit governmental employers 
to enjoy greater flexibility in dealing with their employees. Because they 
promote such beneficial public interests, passive parity should be catego-
rized as a mandatory subject of bargaining. Passive parity clauses merely 
crystallize the "economic facts of life" of the collective bargaining pro-
cess into contract form: All negotiating parties consider the comprehen-
sive economic consequences of each bargaining proposal. 
